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Abstract 
 
We apply recent panel cointegration methods to a structural equation between 
government expenditure and revenue. Allowing for multiple endogenous breaks and 
after computing appropriate bootstrap critical values, we conclude for fiscal 
sustainability in the overall EU15 panel. 
 
Keywords: fiscal sustainability, EU, panel cointegration. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: C23, E62, H62. 
                                                 
 
# Corresponding author: aafonso@iseg.utl.pt, antonio.afonso@ecb.int 
   2
Non-technical summary 
 
The sustainability of public finances is a key policy issue for the European Union (EU). 
Within the EU fiscal framework, fiscal discipline is an important support for the 
implementation of monetary policy, particularly in the case of the European and Monetary 
Union (EMU) countries. In EMU, the existence of sound fiscal policies is seen as a 
necessary objective for individual countries to pursue. For example, it is not possible to 
discard adverse responses from the financial markets when fiscal behaviour is deemed to be 
unsustainable. Indeed, the accumulation of government debt, following continued budgetary 
imbalances, may in the end trigger the need for higher long-term interest rates in order to 
place additional sovereign debt in the markets. Moreover, the Treaties governing the EU 
also require sustainable public finances. Countries are urged to comply with the budgetary 
requirements of EMU, by avoiding excessive deficits, keeping government debt levels 
below the 60 percent of GDP reference value, and respecting the requirements of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
 
We use Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) cointegration technique that generalizes 
the approach in Pedroni (2004) to accommodate cross-sectional dependence, the 
bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007), as well 
as the test from Westerlund (2006) allowing for multiple endogenous structural breaks, 
which can differ among series. This last test generalizes Im et al. (2005) and assumes 
that the individual series are not cross-correlated. However, given that this is an overly 
restrictive assumption in macroeconomics, we draw our empirical conclusions using 
bootstrap-based critical values. 
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Allowing for multiple endogenous breaks and computing appropriate bootstrap values 
to accommodate cross-sectional dependence, we conclude that fiscal policy has been 
sustainable for the EU15 panel over the period 1970-2006. Therefore, existing country 
specific non-sustainability results with short time spans need to be read with care, a 
relevant issue for policy makers.   4
 
1. Introduction 
 
Within a panel framework we study fiscal sustainability in the EU15,
1 assessing 
cointegration between general government expenditure and revenue, stemming from the 
intertemporal government budget constraint.
2 Fiscal sustainability analysis either based 
on unit root or cointegration tests have been mostly performed for individual countries 
posing the problem of relatively short time series. A few exceptions provide panel unit 
root and panel cointegration analysis in this context for the EU, notably Prohl and 
Schneider (2006), while Westerlund and Prohl (2006) study OECD countries, allowing 
for cross-country dependence. 
 
We use Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) cointegration technique that generalizes 
the approach in Pedroni (2004) to accommodate cross-sectional dependence
3, the 
bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007), as well 
as the test from Westerlund (2006) allowing for multiple endogenous structural breaks, 
which can differ among series. This last test generalizes Im et al. (2005) and assumes 
that the individual series are not cross-correlated. However, given that this is an overly 
restrictive assumption in macroeconomics, we draw our empirical conclusions using 
bootstrap-based critical values. The paper is organised as follows: Section Two presents 
the analytical framework; Section Three reports the empirical results and Section Four 
concludes. 
                                                 
1  Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the UK. 
2 See, for instance, Hakkio and Rush (1991), Quintos (1995), Haug (1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) 
and Afonso (2005). 
3 These tests do not provide a uniform solution, and it is not possible to test for cointegration while 
entertaining the possibility of both cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneous breaks. Therefore, we 
only use this test as a benchmark for testing for cointegration in the absence of breaks.   5
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
The starting point for the analysis, the so-called present value borrowing constraint, can 
be written for a given country as 
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where 1 ) ( − − + = t t t t B r r G E , with G - primary government expenditure R - government 
revenue, B - government debt, r - real interest rate, assumed to be stationary with mean 
r. A sustainable fiscal policy needs to ensure that the present value of the stock of public 
debt goes to zero in infinity.  
 
Using GDP ratios, with the GDP real growth rate, y, also assumed constant, we have 
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with  bt = Bt/Yt,  et = Et/Yt and ρt = Rt/Yt. When r > y, the solvency condition 
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s is needed to bound public debt growth.  
 
From (1), and defining 1 − + = t t t t B r G GG , we have  
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With the no-Ponzi game condition, GGt and Rt must be cointegrated of order one for 
their first differences to be stationary. If R and E are non-stationary, and the first 
differences are stationary, then R and E in levels are I(1). Thus, for (3) to hold, its left-
hand side will also have to be stationary, which is possible if GG and R are integrated of   6
order one, with cointegration vector (1,-1). Therefore, assessing fiscal sustainability 
involves testing the cointegration regression:  
  t t t u bGG a R + + = . (4) 
 
3. Estimation results 
 
We first test the stationarity of the fiscal series using panel data unit root tests of the 
first and second generation. The first generation tests (including Hadri, 2000; Im, 
Pesaran and Shin, 2003), were developed on the assumption of the cross-sectional 
independence among panel units (except for common time effects), and may be at odds 
with economic theory and empirical results. On the other hand, second generation tests 
(for instance, Choi, 2006; Moon and Perron, 2004) relax the assumption of cross-
sectional independence, allowing for a variety of dependence across the different units. 
All tests mentioned above were implemented for the general government expenditure 
and the general government revenue taken as a percentage of GDP.
4  The results, not 
reported to save space but available upon request, confirm that for the EU15 panel, 
government expenditure and revenue ratios are non-stationary at the five percent level. 
 
As a second step we test whether expenditure and revenue ratios are cointegrated in line 
with equation (4), comparing the situation that assumes the existence of no breaks with 
that accounting for the possibility of multiple heterogeneous and endogenous structural 
breaks. Definitely, if no account is taken of changes in the parameters of the model, 
inference concerning the presence of cointegration can be affected by misspecification 
                                                 
4 Annual data are from the European Commission AMECO database (updated on 04/05/2007), covering 
the period 1970-2006 (general government total expenditure, % of GDP, 1.0.319.0.UUTGE; 
1.0.319.0.UUTGF; general government total revenue, % of GDP, 1.0.319.0.URTG; 1.0.319.0.URTGF).   7
errors, which can bias conclusions towards accepting the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration (see Campos, Ericsson and Hendry, 1996).  
 
To investigate cointegration without breaks, we used Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(2006) methodology as a benchmark, which tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
and accommodates possible cross-sectional dependence. We also implemented the very 
powerful bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton 
(2007), whose null hypothesis is cointegration and that permits to accommodate 
correlation both within and between the individual cross-sectional units.
5 
 
Finally, the case of cointegration with structural breaks is considered with the use of the 
recent Lagrange multiplier (LM) test developed by Westerlund (2006) for the null 
hypothesis of cointegration, which shows small size distortions and reasonable power. 
This test allows for multiple structural breaks in both the level and trend of a 
cointegrated panel regression, being general enough to allow for endogenous regressors, 
serial correlation and an unknown number of breaks, which may differ among units.  
 
The results are reported in Tables 1 and 2 along with the bootstrap computations. 
Firstly, in Table 1 (the no-break case), accommodating cross-sectional dependence 
using bootstrap is a crucial issue. Indeed, using the standard normal asymptotic critical 
values, results would have been mixed and not conclusive since we reject the null of no 
cointegration between government revenue and expenditure ratios at any conventional 
level (Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre, 2006), and reject the null of cointegration 
(Westerlund and Edgerton, 2007). On the contrary, using bootstrap-based critical values 
                                                 
5 We thank A. Banerjee and J. Carrion-i-Silvestre and J. Westerlund for providing us the GAUSS codes.   8
the two tests provide evidence supporting the hypothesis of cointegration between 
government revenues and expenditures ratios in the no-break case, at the one percent 
level of significance. 
 
Table 1 – Panel cointegration between government revenue and expenditure ratios, 
model with constant term, no structural break 
 
Test ADF-stat   LM-stat    Asymptotic 
 p-value 
Bootstrap distribution 
1%       5%     10% 
Bootstrap 
p-value 
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(2006)
a 
-4.38  -  0.00   -4.88    -4.01   -3.52  - 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2007)
b -  -3.19  0.00  -  0.02 
 
Note: bootstrap based on 2000 replications. 
a - one-sided test, a computed statistic smaller than the critical value implies the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration.  
b  - the null hypothesis is cointegration.  
 
Secondly, allowing for multiple possible breaks (Table 2) the Westerlund (2006) test
 is 
able to detect 41 breaks in the panel and up to 5 significant breaks for Italy and 
Luxembourg. The asymptotic and bootstrap p-values for the null hypothesis of 
cointegration are respectively of 0.01 and 0.15, indicating rejection of the null at five 
and ten percent levels of significance, according to asymptotic p-values. By contrast, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on the bootstrap p-values at all conventional 
level of significance. Hence we conclude for the existence of strong evidence that 
revenue  and expenditure ratios are cointegrated once multiple structural and 
endogenous breaks are accommodated, and once suitable generated bootstrap values 
take cross-sectional dependence into account. 
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Table 2 – Estimated structural breaks (Westerlund, 2006) 
 
Country Number  of 
breaks 
Years 
Austria  2  1977  1996     
Belgium 3  1974  1983  1995     
Denmark  1  1984      
Finland  2  1974  1984     
France  4  1978 1991 1996 2001   
Germany  2  1995  2001     
Greece 3  1980  1990  1995     
Ireland  4  1974 1982 1997 2000   
Italy  5  1979 1986 1991 1996 2001 
Luxembourg  5  1974 1982 1990 1996 2001 
N e t h e r l a n d s   0       
Portugal 3  1981  1987  1995     
Spain 3  1974  1986  1998     
Sweden  4  1975 1981 1990 2000   
United  Kingdom  0      
 
Note: The breaks are estimated using the Bai and Perron (2003) procedure with a maximum number of 
five breaks for each country. The minimum length of each break regime is set to 0:1T. 
 
We also computed the confidence interval for the panel cointegration coefficient of the 
general government expenditure-to-GDP ratios in the cointegrating regression, where 
revenue ratios are the dependent variable. This confidence interval at the 5 percent level 
of significance is [1.028; 1.145], showing that the value of the coefficient is likely to be 
above unity. Therefore, there is a more than proportional raise in the revenue ratios vis-
à-vis increases in the expenditure ratios, implying fiscal sustainability in the panel set. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Allowing for multiple endogenous breaks and computing appropriate bootstrap values 
to accommodate cross-sectional dependence, we conclude that fiscal policy has been 
sustainable for the EU15 panel over the period 1970-2006. Therefore, existing country 
specific non-sustainability results with short time spans need to be read with care, a 
relevant issue for policy makers.   10
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